While states often desire to promote human rights, there are usually complicating political issues and few foreign policy tools. One available tool is economic sanctions. They seek to attach material goods to human rights and can be executed a variety of ways. Some executions work better than others, and some have detrimental, unintended effects. Success usually depends on a number of factors and without a way to isolate the effects of economic sanctions, it is difficult to make a judgement on their impact. Yet, a few cases provide some understanding to how they work well in the real world. South Africa is an example of the success of economic sanctions, but it too is more complicated than a single action or policy tool. Although with limitations, under certain conditions economic sanctions can be an effective part of the promotion of human rights.
As opposed to diplomacy, “the use of discursive means of action,” sanctions are “the use of material means” (Donnelly 2013, 141). These materials can range from aid to ambassadors, and at the extreme, military force (Donnelly 2013, 141). Economic sanctions are a subset that deal specifically with economic goods, such as aid and trade agreements. They can be used to negatively punish violations and to positively reward changes. (Neier 2000, 292). Economic sanctions would seem to be an ideal tool for promoting human rights as they use not only material means, but critical economic resources. Although, there are barriers to states deploying this option. Two competing interests that interfere are those of the business and national security spheres. The business community risks losing profits and competitors taking advantage of their absence. In the other camp, economic sanctions in the name of human rights are viewed as “lack[ing] strategic significance” and undermining national security interests (Neier 2000, 291). These conflicts are part of the challenges of balancing the “security, economic, and ‘other’ goals” that comprise a state’s foreign policy, with human rights often in the “other” lower priority category (Donnelly 2013, 144). Even when national interest lines up with the interests of international human rights, economic sanctions may not be the best tool.
The effectiveness of economic sanctions can be questionable. The goal of economic sanctions is to aid opposition by “undermining target government’s coercive power and political support from elites, as well as the public support” (Peksen, 61). Without access to necessary resources, the violating regime loses the ability to maintain stability and reward supportive groups (Peksen, 61). In practice, economic sanctions often miss their target and disproportionately affect the repressed population. By controlling the resources of the country, violating regimes can avoid the impact of sanctions, instead transferring the cost to its people. Regimes may even benefit from illegal economic activity and manifest loyalty with the necessary groups through the distribution of scarce resources. Violators can become more repressive in order to maintain power as economic inequality and opposition grows, and find justification in the “external threat” of economic sanctions (Peksen 2009, 62).
With these practices of sanctioned regimes in mind, Peksen (2009) evaluates the physical integrity rights in states that were targeted with economic sanctions. Physical integrity rights are the minimum set of rights necessary for life, including freedom from unlawful state killings, torture, and detainment (Peksen 2009, 60). An analysis of twenty years found that human rights situations worsened with economic sanctions. Those imposed specifically for human rights violations actually increases the likelihood of personal integrity rights violations. The author suggests this is because repressive regimes see these demands as a direct threat to power, and thus they become committed to repression (Peksen 2009, 73). The advent of targeted economic sanctions has reduced some of these problems. Targeted sanctions avoid the costs to the public by targeting supporters and elites of the violating regime. These sanctions often take the form of “financial sanctions, asset freezes, travel bans, restrictions on luxury goods, and arms embargoes” (Drezner 2011, 100). There is evidence that targeted economic sanctions lessen the unintended consequences associated with comprehensive sanctions, yet it is doubtful that there is an increase in compliance (Drezner 2011, 104).
In the long term, economic sanctions may isolate the repressive regimes, cutting off outside influence and possibly stunting democratic development. There is an argument that comprehensive sanctions that discourage trade and investment discontinues “economic integration,” which is said to promote human rights “by creating economic wealth” (Peksen 2009, 63). Economic wealth should produce a strong middle class that can gain political power and reform the repressive system (Neier 2000, 293). A study of large scale economic sanctions suggests that they decrease respect for civil and political rights, thus hurting democratic developments. Although targeted sanctions and those that provide incentives through aid or loans, are less likely to negatively impact these rights (Peksen and Drury 2010, 258-9).
Even with these outlined risks, economic sanctions are not without benefits. While a number of studies examining a more comprehensive history of economic sanctions suggest they are relatively ineffective, evaluating individual cases provides a different perspective. One of the best uses of economic sanctions was in reaction to Poland’s ban of the social movement Solidarity in the 1980s. The specificity of the demands and incentives attached to improvements, as well as the desire of Poland to conserve a close relationship to the US, contributed to the success (Neier 2000, 302). Even in the botched attempt at extreme sanctions after Tiammen Square, in the form of revoking Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status, brought increased attention to China’s human rights violations (Neier 2000, 296). With the most repressive regimes, economic sanctions cannot be depended upon alone to enact change. A number of factors of the target state and the sanctioning community can determine the success of these sanctions. As will be illustrated in the case of South Africa, context is incredibly important.
While racial discrimination was present in South Africa since colonization, in 1950 the apartheid system, “a distinctive style of unusually deep and wide-ranging systematic racial domination,” began to be codified (Donnelly 2013, 88). Race regulated every part of life in the country and whites, who made up 16 percent of the population, controlled the economic and political power (Treverton and Varle 1992, 2). In the 1960s repression increased with laws that sought to control opposition and activism from long standing resistance organizations (Donnelly 2013, 90). The film A Dry White Season (1989) illustrates some of the human rights violations that occurred, including the unlawful intimidation, detainment, torture, and killings of those deemed to be a political threat. It also portrays local demonstrations and activists, both black and white, that are meet with security forces (A Dry White Season 1989). While the UN did take some measures to pressure South Africa on their human rights record, it was not until racial violence flared over the new constitution in 1984, that economic sanctions were widely utilized against the apartheid regime (Treverton and Varle 1992, 6).
Many states were using economic sanctions against South Africa by 1985, including the US, where the policy had previously been “constructive engagement.” President Reagan was not in favor of the policy tool, but facing enormous congressional pressure he issued an executive order in 1985 that imposed economic sanctions (Treverton and Varle 1992, 22). They were considered weak by critics and banned some exports and imports, suspended loans, and asked companies operating in South Africa to foster integration. By 1986, Congress was able to override President Reagan and impose tougher sanctions (Neier 2000, 299). Beyond state sanctions, a large divestment campaign spurred discussion and action by demanding institutions divest in companies that operate in South Africa. By the end of the 1980s South Africa’s economy was suffering and in 1990 important political opponents were released from prison and negotiations for a new constitution were announced. (Neier 2000, 300)
The degree to which economic sanctions contributed to this decline is still debated. But, possibly a more important impact of the sanctions was identifying South Africa “as a pariah state” that had been rejected by the West (Neier 2000, 299-300). The international sports boycott also signified this rejection. The impact of this spurn on the white population, which saw South Africa “as a cultural outpost of Western civilization,” was significant (Neier 2000, 299). The cultural importance of sport is even seen in A Dry White Season, as the main character garners a certain amount of respect and leeway as a former national rugby player, illustrated in a scene where he wears a blazer with the Springbok badge to a meeting where he advocates for a black man being detained (A Dry White Season 1989).
Economic sanctions were successful in a number of ways in South Africa. As with most cases of human rights improvements, a number of factors converged at the right moment. Economic sanctions contributed in some part to the economic downturn that hurt the repressive regime, and they were a necessary cue to the world’s intolerance of apartheid. An important part of the success of South Africa was the existence of an established, organized opposition movement, and active public support in sanctioning countries. Like in the case of Poland, in order for the sanctions to have the added meaning of rejection, the repressive regime and elites had to care about the opinion of the sanctioning states.
It is important to not overstate the significance of a single case study, as it does not give a generalizable verdict on economic sanctions. Studies that take into account a number of instances of economic sanctions often illustrate the overall detrimental effects and the low rate of compliance. Though this analysis is flawed as well, as it can lose some of the nuance of a particular case. Together these two methods do point to some lessons about economic sanctions. This policy tool cannot be the only action used to induce meaningful change. There are unintended consequences to consider, and targeted sanctions and those with clear goals and incentives can be more successful. Domestic conditions, such as established resistance and an significant connection to the sanctioning state, are also critical. There is no way to ensure the success of economic sanctions in the name of human rights, but given the right context they can make a meaningful impact.
Bibliography
A Dry White Season. 1989. Directed by Euzhan Palcy. Beverly Hills, CA: MGM Studios.
Donnelly, Jack. 2013. International Human Rights. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2011. “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice” International Studies Review 13: 96-108. Accessed November 22, 2015.
Neier, Aryeh. 2000. “Economic Sanctions and Human Rights.” In Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact, edited by Samantha Power and Graham Allison, 291-308. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Peksen, Dursun. 2009. “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights.” Journal of Peace Research 46(1): 59-77. Accessed November 22, 2015.
Peksen, Dursun and A. Cooper Drury. 2010. “Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy, International Interactions.” International Interactions 36(3): 240-64. Accessed November 22, 2015.
Treverton, Gregory F. and Pamela Varle. 1992. “The United States and South Africa: The 1985 Sanctions Debate.” Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.